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1. Introduction 
Producer durables last for many years. But as more and more services are extracted 
from them through utilization or pure deterioration and technological obsolescence, their 
earning capability declines until eventually they are scrapped or replaced. Hence efforts to 
derive an index of “capital-in-general” from the wide variety of durables that are usually em-
ployed in the economy should take into consideration the way in which they deteriorate. Yet 
even a cursory perusal would suffice to reveal that the relevant literature either ignores the 
deterioration of producer durables altogether or it presumes that it proceeds at a constant rate 
per unit of time, which implies that their replacement is modeled as a constant proportion of the 
outstanding stocks. To ascertain that this is the case, consider the contributions by Solow (1955-
1956) and Fisher (1965). The necessary and sufficient conditions that they derive for constructing 
an index of aggregate capital emanate from models in which the capital goods are presumed to be 
infinitely durable, thus abstracting completely from the difficulties associated with their decay. On 
the contrary, when Samuelson (1962) introduced the model of “surrogate capital” and Green 
(1966) revisited the problem of aggregation both postulated that the physical depreciation is al-
ways proportional to the outstanding physical stocks.  
Certainly the proportionality hypothesis had a lot to recommend it. Jorgenson (1965) 
supported it with appeals to renewal theory. The results by such eminent economists as Prein-
reich (1940), Terborgh (1952) and Smith (1961) pointed favorably in its direction; and not less 
attractive was that it facilitated the construction of models that permitted simple and elegant so-
lutions.1 However, despite its overwhelming acceptance by economic theorists and practitio-
ners, the proportionality hypothesis has at least one fundamental shortcoming. This is its impli-
cation that the decay of capital goods is invariant with respect to their ages. As a result, soon 
after it was introduced in the 1950s it became clear from the writings of Haavelmo (1960) and 
others that this conceptualization rendered aggregation feasible by ignoring the durability of 
capital goods. So while a group of academic economists headed by Robinson (1953-54, 1959) 
rejected the possibility of deriving an aggregate index of “capital-in-general”, another group 
continued to toil over the issues involved on the conviction that some satisfactory middle 
ground was possible.  
As could be expected the researchers in the latter group built on the solid finding by the 
great Austrian and Swedish economists that the time structure of aggregate capital is indispen-
sable for explaining the contribution to productivity, income shares, business cycles, etc., of 
producer durables. To liberate themselves from the narrow point-input point-output analyses of 
yesteryears, initially they abandoned the concept of the period of production and instead fo-
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cused on the longevity or useful life of capital goods. A characteristic example of the progress 
that was accomplished on account of this change is found in the contributions by Blitz (1958) 
and Westfield (1958), who showed how optimal longevity of capital could be computed in the 
presence of technological obsolescence. Two years later Haavelmo (1960) made the first ever 
attempt to achieve consistent aggregation of two capital goods that differ in quantity and lon-
gevity.2 But even though his approach was promising, his analysis was restricted by two as-
sumptions. Namely, that no technological change took place and that the useful lives of the 
aggregated capital goods were exogenously given. Thus further progress required that these 
two assumptions be relaxed. My objective here is to demonstrate that considerable headway 
can be made in this direction by combining a two-sector generalization of the one-sector capi-
tal vintage model presented by Brems (1968) with the approach to aggregation suggested by 
Haavelmo (1960).   
To this end, I consider an economy with two sectors. The representative firms X and 
Y that operate in them are characterized by three fundamental differences. The first of them 
is that, whereas firm X supplies electricity, which is a necessity with relatively inelastic de-
mand that lasts forever, firm Y supplies tennis rackets, which is a luxury with highly elastic 
demand that may vanish at any time due to shifts in tastes. The second difference springs 
from the implication that, because of the inherent difference in the nature of their products, 
the two firms are bound to view their re-investment opportunities differently. Firm X would 
plan for the indefinite future by adopting a capital policy of perpetual replacements, 
whereas firm Y would adopt a scrapping policy, which would give it an option to decide at 
the end of the useful life of its current investment whether to exit or reinvest, depending on 
the demand for tennis rackets at that time.3 Finally, the third difference is that technical pro-
gress increases the productivity of more recent vintages of the durables in each sector at dif-
ferent constant and exogenous rates. Otherwise firms X and Y are similar. In particular, they 
face downward sloping demand curves, implying that they behave as monopolists. They 
deter other firms from entering into their markets to take advantage of the higher pro-
ductivity of newer durables by applying a pricing rule that transfers all benefits from tech-
nological change to final consumers; and last, but not list, while the durables they build in-
ternally are fixed in the sense that they cannot be moved from the one sector to the other, 
workers move freely in the economy.  
Due to the structural and behavioral differences of firms X and Y, the model that 
emerges leads to different useful lives for their durables. To be sure, drawing on Bitros and 
Flytzanis (2005), this finding would be expected even if the firms differed only with respect 
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to their capital policies, i.e. replacement vs. scrapping. But in the richer modeling environ-
ment of this paper the differences in the useful lives arise also because the two firms operate 
in markets with different elasticities of demand and different rates of embodied technical 
change. Thus, as soon as the attention turns from microeconomics to macroeconomics, the 
analysis confronts the question of how to aggregate the two durables, since: a) they are not sub-
stitutes and hence their physical quantities cannot be translated into an index of homogeneous 
units; b) older vintages differ from newer vintages because the latter embody the more recent ad-
vances in technology, and c) depending on the elasticities of demand for electricity and tennis 
rackets, the rates of embodied technological change, and other market parameters, the durables of 
firm X may last longer than those of firm Y. To tackle it, the investigation starts from the realiza-
tion that at the sectoral level the quantities of the two durables are expressed in uniform monetary 
values of constant prices. This implies that, if they did not differ in any other respect, adding their 
purchase values would give an index of the quantity of “capital-in general”. But the two durables 
differ also in quality as well as durability and this approximation would be open to serious objec-
tions from both the theoretical and the empirical standpoints. Therefore, taking into consideration 
that the useful lives of the two durables account endogenously for the differences in their quality, 
the model is endowed with a Haavelmo (1960, 95-102) type mechanism, which, by expressing the 
two durables in units of standard durability, permits their aggregation in a consistent manner. 
Moreover, drawing on the results from a comparative evaluation of the traditional and the pro-
posed approach to aggregation, it is established that insisting on the former may be responsible for 
significant biases in the estimates of the economy-wide capital stock.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 initially highlights the key role of the 
proportionality hypothesis in the dominant theory of aggregation; then it conducts a brief survey of 
the available literature, and lastly it makes a case for replacing the proportionality hypothesis with 
models linking the decay of producer durables to their ages. Section 3 suggests an approach for do-
ing so by proposing a two-sector vintage capital model with exogenous technological change and 
endogenous useful lives. Section 4 characterizes the properties of its solution for the aggregate capi-
tal stock, and Section 5 contains a summary of the main findings and conclusions. 
2.  The theory of aggregation and the proportionality hypothesis 
 Before the mid 1960s, the evidence in support of the proportionality hypothesis was 
mostly indirect in the sense that no results had been reported linking it to the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for achieving consistent aggregation. At the time economic theorists adopted it 
because all indications from neighboring areas of research were in its favor. Direct evidence 
 5
started to emerge with the contributions by Whitaker (1966) and Hall (1968) that highlighted the 
conditions for aggregation in a one-sector vintage model of capital. Just to indicate why the pro-
portionality hypothesis proved paramount in this respect, consider the following analysis. 
 In the absence of technological change of any kind, an aggregate capital stock is said to 
exist at time t, if it is computed according to the formula: 
J
 
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
t T t T
J t t I d t I dψ υ υ υ ψ υ υ υ− −= = −∫ ∫ ,                                (1) 
 
where ( )I υ  represents gross investment at time tυ < , the function (t )ψ υ−  is an approximation 
to the function ( , )tψ υ  and stands for the deterioration or loss of output efficiency by an invest-
ment aged t υ−  periods, and T is a constant useful life uniform across all vintages. If  de-
notes the durables of age T that are scrapped at t and 
( )TS t
( )tψ υ−′ represents the derivative of 
(t )ψ υ−  with respect to time we have: 
 
( ) (0) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
T t T
dJ I t S t t I
dt
dψ ψ υ υ−= − + −′∫ υ .                                 (2) 
 
Next, introducing the normalization (0) 1ψ =  and expressing the integral in (2) as: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( , ) (
( )
t
t T
tt I d t
t
)T J tψ υψ υ υ υ κψ υ−
−′− =−∫ ,                                    (3) 
 
where the function  describes the percentage deterioration of the durables of all ages that 
remain in the capital stock, expression (2) can be written as: 
( , )t Tκ
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )T
dJ t I t S t t T J t
dt
κ= − + .                                                (4) 
 
From this it follows that the existence of  depends on ( )J t ( , )t Tκ , and hence eventually on the 
time, t, the useful life, T , and the form of the function κ . Therefore, assuming that we know or 
can approximate the form of this function, any time the useful life T  changes, the differential 
equation in (4) will give a different stock of capital, thus prohibiting aggregation without taking 
into consideration the useful life of aggregated durables. But now consider the very special case 
where the deterioration function takes the form ( )( ) tt e δ υψ υ α − −− = , in which  and α δ  are con-
stants independent ofυ . Then the producer durables deteriorate by radioactive decay, thus imply-
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ing that  and expression (3) yields:  ( ) 0TS t =
( )( ) ( ) (
( )
t
t T
tt I d
t
)J tψ υψ υ υ υ δψ υ−
−′− −∫ = − .                                         (3′)  
 
Consequently, substituting (3′) into (4) we obtain the well-known differential equation:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )dJ t I t J t
dt
δ= −  .                                                            (5) 
 
This proves that the aggregate capital stock  can be defined uniquely if and only if deteriora-( )J t
tion for all vintages of investment proceeds exponentially at the constant rateδ .4  
 The link of the proportionality hypothesis to the conditions for consistent aggregation 
in the case of differentiated producer durables was highlighted by Zarembka (1975), who in-
vestigated the question of collapsing a static multisectoral economy into a two-sector model 
of heterogeneous capital. In particular, and because of the importance of the issue involved, 
here is how he summarized his findings: 
 
“… In a steady-state model it is reasonable to assume that depreciation5 is some 
constant fraction of the stock of a particular capital good [my note: in a footnote he 
refers to Jorgenson (1974)] and that the rate does not vary substantially according to 
the goods produced (with some exceptions)… But if the depreciation rate varies 
substantially among capital goods, then the reduction of equation (10) to (11) in the 
capital goods sectors does not obtain (and similarly for the consumer goods sectors). 
Therefore, in comparing steady-state equilibria, it is not possible to aggregate capital 
goods with different depreciation rates (and thus one reason why capital in structures 
and equipment needs to be disaggregated)” (p. 113).  
 
On this account in order to collapse a multisectoral economy into two sectors, one producing capi-
tal goods and another producing consumer goods, the capital goods within each sector must de-
preciate at constant uniform rates.  However, as full aggregation in the sense of reducing the mul-
tisectoral economy into one sector fell outside the scope of his research, this author stopped short 
of considering the interesting question whether the depreciation rates in the two sectors had to be 
equal or not for their aggregation.  
 This question was raised and answered a year later by Brown and Chang (1976) in the 
confines of a static general equilibrium model of production. More specifically, these authors 
investigated the conditions for intrasectoral, intersectoral and full aggregation and found that, as 
long as the depreciation of capital goods is proportional to the respective stocks, such aggregation 
can be achieved even if the depreciation rates are unequal. Apparently this finding contradicted 
 7
the results obtained by Zarembka (1975). But it ascertained beyond any doubt that that the propor-
tionality hypothesis is one of the cornerstones of the received theory of aggregation.  
 Having arrived at this conclusion it was natural to assess its standing in economic the-
ory and empirical research. The results of this endeavor are presented in Bitros (2008). From 
this survey it follows that the proportionality hypothesis is in conflict with both theoretical and 
empirical evidence. In particular, the dominant view of replacement theorists is that the conditions 
for a constant replacement/capital stock ratio are highly restrictive and unlikely to hold in reality. 
In the area of economic growth and business cycles the hypothesis is being abandoned in favor of 
an economic theory of replacement.  All theory of industrial organization is based on the view that 
how sturdy producer durables are built is decided at the time of their production on the basis of 
economic criteria and that their useful lives are determined eventually by such deliberate eco-
nomic processes as the intensity of utilization and maintenance; and last, but not least, the 
implication that firms cannot affect the manner in which their durables decay is completely alien 
with the modes of thinking in neighboring fields like capital budgeting, operations management 
and accounting. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that the replacement investment/capital 
stock ratio varies over the business cycle under the influence of key economic variables; the age-
price profiles of durables do not support the view that depreciation rates are geometric, and the 
scrappage rate is determined to a significant extent by market forces. Therefore, the abandonment of 
the proportionality hypothesis is long overdue. How this may be done and what would be the 
implications for aggregation theory are the issues of focus below. 
 
3. Aggregation with exogenous technological change and endogenous useful lives 
 Once the proportionality hypothesis is abandoned, in order for the aggregate capital 
stock to exist and be well defined we need an analytical framework to explain the deter-
mination of the useful live of capital stock, T . For then, assuming that the form of the func-
tion is known or can be approximated, the terms 
( )J t
( , )t Tκ ( , ) ( )t T K tκ and  in expression 
(3) are fully determined. The objective in this section is to present a model in which the useful 
live of producer durables is decided along with other key variables in the presence of exoge-
nous but embodied technological change. 
( )TS t
 
3.1 The model 
Before embarking on the presentation of the model, it is convenient to clarify the meaning 
of the symbols used to denote its variables and parameters. This is done in Table 1 below. 
(Please insert here Table 1) 
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Now consider an economy with two firms and any number of workers. Each firm consists of 
two lines of production, one constructing an intermediate durable called capital solely by 
means of labor6 and another producing a final good by combining each unit of capital with 
one unit of labor. Let firm X  produce electricity and firm Y  produce tennis rackets. In year 
υ , firm X  uses electric generators capable of producing XK ( )υ  units of electricity, whereas 
firm  employs a lathe capable of producing Y YK υ( )  thousand rackets per year. Usage does 
not wear capital because its effects are exactly offset by maintenance. But from the one period 
to the next XK υ( ) and YK υ( )  become more productive because newer vintages of capital 
embody the most recent advances in science and technology. So to capture the impact of em-
bodied technological change, let the productivity of newer vintages of capital increase respec-
tively at the constant and exogenous rates and X Yμ μ . Then newer vintages of capital would 
present a competitive advantage to firms that might wish to enter into the two sectors. For this 
reason, assume finally that to deter potential entrants firms X and Y reduce the prices of their 
products at the rate of technological change. The issue I want to investigate here is how to de-
rive a consistent measure of economy-wide capital. To this end I proceed as follows.  
 
3.1.1 Microeconomics 
The representative firms that operate in the two sectors of the economy are character-
ized by the fundamental differences that were described in the introduction. Hence, I will ana-
lyze their economics separately.  
 
Representative Firm X 
Assume that firm X faces a demand curve for electricity of the constant elasticity type:  
 
   [ ] XX XX ( ) N P ( )
ηυ = υ
X
,                                                         (6) 
  
where 1, 0, >0, 0X XX N Pη υ υ< − > >( ) ( ) . 
During year υ  the firm uses XK υ( )  units of electricity generating capacity, all of 
which are equally productive because they embody the same technology. Hence, let its pro-
duction function take the form:7
 
1 X
X X
X
KX K b
b X
υυ υ υυ υ= ⇒
( )( ) ( ) ( )=
( ) ( ) .                                        (7)                          
 
As it will be useful below, observe that the inverse of the capital-output coefficient, Xb υ( ) , gives 
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the marginal productivity of capital of vintage υ .  
Electricity capacity built after year υ  is expected to be more productive because of 
technological progress. So to allow for this consideration, and following the demonstration in 
Appendix A, let the capital-output coefficient of firmX decline through time as follows:8
 
     XX X
tb t b eμ υυ −= ( )( ) ( ) ,                                                            (8) 
 
where  and <0.Xtυ μ<  
 Next, regarding the minimum amount of labor required to build a unit of electricity generat-
ing capacity, I assume that: 
 
     [X XM b ( )0 ]
γβ = ,                                                                (9)  
 
where and XM >0 < -1γ . This implies that, if the firm tried to cut its capital-output coefficient by 
half, the minimum amount of labor required to build a unit of electricity generating capacity would 
increase by more than half, thus prohibiting the firm from growing to such an extent that it might 
become a monopoly in the whole economy.  
Finally, recalling that the useful life of electric generators is , XT XK υ( )  is kept in operation 
for the time interval Xt Tυ υ< < + . During these years another firm may enter the market by purchas-
ing newer, and hence more productive, electricity generators. So to discourage potential competition 
firm X  reduces the price of electricity at the rate of technological progress by setting:  
 
 XX X
tP t P eμ υυ −= (( ) ( ) ) .                                                       (10) 
                          
At this point one may ask: how do we know that this pricing rule does deter new entrants? To 
ascertain that it does, divide (10) by (8) and set 0υ =  to obtain: 
 
  
0
0
X X
X X
P ( t ) P ( )
b ( t ) b ( )
= .                                                        (11)                        
 
What this equation signifies is that by following (11) the representative firm prices the elec-
tricity produced by the various vintages of electricity generators so as to equate the value of the 
marginal Kilowatt-Hour produced by the most recent vintage of electricity generators to that pro-
duced from the initial vintage. But according to the proof in Appendix B the price of electricity 
from the initial vintage is calculated to reduce the unit net worth of electricity generators to zero. 
 10
Consequently, the same must hold for every vintage up to t , and hence no potential competitor 
should have an incentive to enter, because no potential competitor can expect to make any profits 
by taking advantage of more productive electricity generators. In essence, under the pressure to 
protect its market from potential competitors, firm X is forced to pass all benefits of technological 
change to the consumers of electricity. This is the miracle of potential competition.  
Drawing on the above and the step-by-step explanations found in Appendix C, if the 
salvage value of equipment on retirement is zero, the unit net worth of new electricity genera-
tors at 0υ =  is given by: 
 
 
( )
0
0 0 1 10 [ ]
0 0
X X X
X
X
T TT t tX X
X
X X X
P ( ) P ( ) e en e w e dt w w
b ( ) b ( )
μ σ σ
μ σ βσβ σ μ σ
− −
− − −= − − = −−∫( ) + .       (12)     
 
Observe that the term  in the parenthesis is multiplied by 0 0X XP ( )/b ( )
teμ . This implies that the 
unit value of the marginal product of the electricity generators declines at the rate μ  per unit of 
time, because 0Xμ < .  The obvious reason is that as time goes by the earning capability of these 
electricity generators becomes inferior relative to the new ones that are more productive, since 
they embody the most recent advances in technology. Subtracting from the unit value of the mar-
ginal product the fixed unit labor cost, , we obtain a declining stream of net unit income. Fi-
nally, discounting the latter over the useful life of the electricity generators with the help of the 
positive discount factor σ , we arrive at the unit net worth, . 
w
0Xn ( )
 Firm X  is justifiably presumed to behave as if its monopoly will last forever on two 
grounds. The first is that by pricing electricity according to (10) it deters all competition from 
new potential entrants, whereas the second springs from the realization that, since electricity 
is a necessity, it will be always in demand. By implication, at any period the firm must have 
no more and no less than the necessary electricity generating capacity to meet this demand. 
For if it has less it will be losing sales and if it has more it will be wasting resources.9 As a 
result, since reinvestment opportunities will repeat indefinitely, the firm is led to maximize 
the present value of profits from an infinite series of equidistant replacements.10 Using (6) and 
(12) in conjunction with the expression (D.2) derived in the Appendix D, the objective func-
tion becomes:  
-
- -
0 0 0 0 1 1, 0 0 0 [ 0 ]
1 0
X
X
X X X X
T
X X X
X X X X X-( )T -( )T
X
b ( )n ( )X( ) P ( ) w e(T P ( ))= b ( )N ( ) P ( )
-e b( ) -e
σ
η
μ σ μ σ1
βσ
σ μ σ
⎡ ⎤− +Π = −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
      (13) 
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From the first order conditions for and we obtain:0  XP ( ) XT
11
 
 ( )
10 0
1 1
X X
X X
T
X X
X XT
X
eP b
e
μ
μ σ
η σ μ βσ
η σ
−
−
− − += + −( ) ( )w
X )
,                             (14) 
 
      1X X XT TXe e ( )(
μ σσ μ βσ σ− −− = + − μ .                                    (15)                        
 
Equation (15) does not permit an explicit solution for T . However, it can be established that 
one and only one positive solution for T  exists.  
X
X
To sketch the proof, consider Figure 1. Let the left-hand side of (15) be denoted by the func-
tion . If we set , we see that this function takes the value Xg( T ) 0XT = Xσ μ− . Next, as the useful 
life rises above zero, the curve  rises because it holds that 
. To ascertain that this is the case, observe 
that the first term of this derivative has  raised to the positive power 
XT Xg( T )
( ) / +X X X X X XT T T TX X X Xe e T e e
μ σ μ σσ μ μ σ σμ− − − −∂ − ∂ = −
          (Please insert here Figure 1) 
0>
e X XTμ−  and multiplied by 
the positive coefficient Xμ σ− ; thus when T  rises without bound the first term also does so. 
The second term has  raised to the negative power 
X
e XTσ− ; therefore as T rises without 
bound the second term vanishes. These findings are depicted by the bold upward sloping 
X
curve .Xg( T )
12 Finally, looking at the right-hand side of (15), notice that it does not contain 
. This implies that the right-hand side defines a horizontal line, labeled as , which cuts 
the vertical axis above the value 
XT FF ′
Xσ μ−  because 1 X Xβσ σ μ σ μ+( )( - ) ( -> ) . Therefore, the 
curve is bound to cut the horizontal line just once, giving the optimal service life T .  Xg( T )
*
X
At this point it is interesting to pose the following question: how does the optimal use-
ful life  change when the parameters in equation (15) change? To answer it, I computed T  for 
various combinations of empirically reasonable values of 
*
XT
*
X
σ , Xμ  and β  from the United States in 
the postwar period. These values are exhibited in Table 2 below.  Looking across each row, we ob-
serve that for every pair of values assumed by the parameters Xμ  and β  the optimal useful live of 
          (Please insert here Table 2) 
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electricity generators would be longer the higher the interest rate. Next, focusing in a single 
column, we notice two results. The first has to do with the cases where the parameters σ and 
β  remain constant and only Xμ changes. In all cases it turns out that the useful life is uniformly 
longer, the slower is technological progress. As to the second result, this corresponds to the 
cases where the parameters σ and Xμ  are held constant and only β  changes. From them it 
emerges that, the costlier the acquisition of electricity generators in terms of the minimum la-
bor required for their construction, the longer their useful live. As we would expect, these re-
sults make a lot of sense because the costlier the producers’ goods and the higher the interest 
rate, the more urgent it becomes to save capital cost by lengthening their useful lives, whereas 
the slower the technological progress, the less difference between the efficiencies of produc-
ers’ goods of consecutive vintages, and hence the lower the pressure of retirement. 
Introducing  and (9) into (15) and using the resulting expression in conjunction 
with (6), (7) and (12) we find:   
*
XT
 
   
*
* 10 1
1
ση βσ
η σ
−⎡ ⎤ − +−⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦
XT
X
X
X
en ( ) = w                                 (16)  
 
  
*
*
1
* 10 [ ] [ ]
1 1
XX
X X
T
X X
X X T
X X
eK N w
Me
ησ
η γ
μ σ
η σ μ βσ β
η σ
+−
−
− − +
+ −
X
( )
( )
( )= .                      (17) 
                
From these we observe that both the unit net worth  and the quantity of electricity 
generating capacity depend also on . But from (15) we know that  depends on the capital pol-
icy adopted by the firm. Consequently, under a policy of perpetual equidistant replacements the 
construction cost and the market value of the surviving physical capital employed by firm 
* 0Xn ( )
* 0XK ( )
*
XT
*
XT
X would 
be given respectively by  and .  * 0β XwK ( ) * *0 0X Xn ( )K ( )
 
Representative Firm Y  
Now let me turn to firm Y . Above it was indicated that this firm plans either to exit at 
the end of the useful life of the lathe or re-invest, if market conditions warrant it. Moreover, 
since by assumption firm Y  applies pricing rule (5), it defends its market from potential com-
petitors as securely as firm X . So the natural question is why should firm Y  behave differ-
ently regarding its re-investment opportunities?  The answer is that tennis rackets is a luxury 
good whose demand is very sensitive to income and fashion trends, and hence demand condi-
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tions may have changed drastically at the end of the useful life of its current stock of capital. 
By implication, acting rationally firm Y  retains an option to decide whether to exit or re-
invest in the light of the demand conditions that will prevail at .YT
13 Following then the same 
analysis as for firm X , but without an infinite series of re-investments, firm Y maximizes:14  
 
- -0 1 1, 0 0 0 0 0 [ 0 ]
0
Y Y Y
Y
-( )T T
Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y
P ( ) -e e(T P( ))=b ( )n ( )Y( ) b ( ( ) P ( ) w
b( )
μ σ σ
η0)N
⎡ βσ
σ μ σ
⎤− +Π = − ,       (18)   ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
 
with respect to  and . In (13) it should be observed that YT 0YP ( ) β  is the same as that in 
equation (4). This implies that: 
 
 [ ]γβ = Y YM b ( )0 .                                                                  (9′)                          
 
The rationale for this assumption is that the minimum required labor to build a unit of productive 
capacity should be the same across the two representative firms, because differences in productivity 
in their capital building departments would tend to vanish through a competitive reallocation of 
workers among them.   
From the first order conditions for maximization of (18) we obtain: 
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1 1Y Y YT TY Y Y Y
Y Y
e e ( )(μ σ )η η μ σσ βσ σ μη η
− −+ +− = + − .                             (20)                      
 
Denoting the left-hand side of (20) by the function , we observe that as  goes to zero 
this function takes the value 
Yh( T ) YT
Yσ μ− . Hence, if we set X Yμ μ= in order to highlight the differ-
ences that emerge in the useful lives of the stocks of capital in the two sectors due to the dif-
ferent capital policies applied by the two representative firms, both functions  and 
 start from the same point on the vertical axis in Figure 1. Next let  rise above zero and 
take the derivative of . As  rises without bound, this derivative remains positive, which 
means that  always rises. Then the important question is whether the function  rises 
to the left or to the right of function . To tackle it, let us compare the derivatives of  
and  with respect to the corresponding useful lives. These derivatives are: 
Xg( T )
Yh( T ) YT
Yh( T ) YT
Yh( T ) Yh( T )
Xg( T ) Xg( T )
Yh( T )
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Now, given that Xμ μ= , if we let =XT TY  expression  (22) differs from (21) only in that it in-
cludes the second term, which is negative because 0 and 1Y Yμ η< < − . This ascertains that (22) 
is smaller than (21) at any optimal useful life, and hence that  rises always to the right of 
. Consequently, if the rates of embodied technological change are the same in both sectors, 
in Figure 1 the function  will cut the horizontal line 
Yh( T )
Xg( T )
Yh( T ) FF ′  to the right of , say at , and 
the optimal useful life of the lathe will be longer solely because firm Y applies scrapping. Thus, hav-
ing computed  from (20), the values for  and  can be derived with the help of: 
*
XT
*
YT
*
YT
* 0Yn ( )
* 0YK ( )
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in conjunction with (6), (7) and (19). In particular, we obtain:  
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From them it turns out that, once we find , the other two key variables, i.e. the unit net 
worth  and the stock of physical capital , are fully determined. 
*
YT
* 0Yn ( )
* 0YK ( )
 
3.2 Macroeconomics 
Let us turn now from microeconomics to macroeconomics. Since the two representative 
firms produce their goods by means of different capital, the question that arises is how to define 
and measure the capital employed in the economy.15 If electricity generators and lathes were per-
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ishable goods like lemons and oranges, the answer would be very easy. Simply, we would multi-
ply their prices by their quantity and we would sum the results to compute their aggregate value in 
the economy. But this approach is untenable under the present circumstances because the durables 
employed in the economy are determined by three variables, i.e. acquisition cost, quantity and 
useful live. Hence, we must devise a different approach. 
Following Haavelmo (1960, pp. 100-101), a reasonably consistent index of the economy-
wide stock of capital in the absence of technological change may be derived by: a) deflating appro-
priately the money values of the various components of the capital stock to obtain “constant-dollar” 
denominated series; b) converting the deflated value figures to an “equal-durability” basis, and c) 
adding the resulting series. In the confines of the present model, the unit cost wβ  of building each 
type of capital is constant. Hence there is no need for deflation to obtain “constant dollar” figures. 
But electricity generators and lathes have different useful lives and must be converted to an “equal-
durability” basis. To express the longevity of  in terms of the longevity of , I start 
from the realization that the construction cost of the capital goods is equal to the discounted present 
value of the stream of net revenues over their useful lives.  On this ground I write:  
* 0YK ( )
* 0XK ( )
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0
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Y
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Y
Y
P ( )w K ( ) e w e dt
b ( )
μ σβ −= −∫ .                                           (25) 
 
If  had been of the same longevity as , it would earn annually the same income but over the 
useful life .  Therefore, for the hypothetical capital stock ,  (25) would transform into:  
*
YK
*
XK
*
XT
** 0K ( )
 
*
**
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X
Y
T t tY
Y
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Next, dividing (26) by (25) and rearranging we obtain: 
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Finally, by adding the stocks of capital in the two sectors, I obtain: 
 
* * ** * *0 [ 0 0 ] [ 0 0X Y X Y ]K ( ) w K ( ) K ( ) w K ( ) zK ( )β β= + = + .                         (28) 
                          
From this expression it is clear that the conventional approach of obtaining  as 
 corresponds to 
* 0K ( )
* *[ 0 0X Yw K ( ) K ( )β + ] 1z = .  But is this justified? From the theoretical point of 
view it would be if and only if it transpired that *XT T
*
Y=  and X Yμ μ= .  Yet as I will argue shortly 
none of these conditions is likely to be met individually and certainly not both at the same time. 
Therefore, the only justification would be if  were reasonably close to 1 at least empirically. 
Under what circumstances would such an approximation be warranted, if at all, is the subject of 
the analysis in the following section.  
z
 
4. The aggregate stock of capital 
Turning first to the main properties of the solution, recall from Section 2 that researchers 
in the area of aggregation assume traditionally that firms replace their durables as per the propor-
tionality hypothesis and that the rate of embodied technological change is uniform throughout the 
economy. So an issue that arises concerns the implications for aggregation if the rates of embod-
ied technological change in the two sectors of the economy differ. To highlight it, assume that the 
two representative firms apply replacement but X Yμ μ≠ . Then from equation (15) it would follow 
that and it would be impossible to achieve consistent aggregation without expressing 
the two types of durables in terms of equal durability. Not unexpectedly the same conclusion 
would hold if 
*   XT T≠ *Y
YXμ μ=  and firm X applied replacement, whereas firm Y applied scrapping. For 
then the equations (15) and (20) would give . Finally, observe that the solution for  
from equation (20) involves the elasticity 
*  XT T≠ *Y *YT
*
Yη , which varies over the business cycle.  As a result 
the useful life of capital in the Y sector of the economy varies with it, thus shifting the time struc-
ture of aggregate capital.  Hence, it is no wonder that scrapping is a prime mechanism for the 
propagation of business cycles, irrespective of the causes that start them. 
From the above it follows that on the basis of the proposed model the value of  would be 
expected to differ from 1, thus invalidating the conventional approach to aggregation. But even so it 
may be sufficiently close to 1 to save us from the complexities of having to deal with the non-
stationarities that would be involved in the computation of deterioration-age profiles. To investigate 
this possibility, some of the variables and parameters in (27) were given arbitrary values, some oth-
z
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ers were approximated with empirically plausible values from the United States in the postwar pe-
riod, and still some others were allowed to vary over reasonable ranges. In particular, what values 
the variables and parameters in (27) received and why is explained below: 
• The marginal product in the Y sector, , was normalized to 1 and the wage 
rate w was set equal to 0.30.  
0 0Y YP ( )/b ( )
• The value of the elasticity of output demand in the Y sector, Yη , which enters in the 
computation of from (20), was set equal to –15. In the computations this parameter 
could be allowed to vary. But here it was fixed in order to focus exclusively on the ef-
fects on  of the interest rate and the relative rates of technological change.  
YT
z
• The approximation to the minimum building laborβ was derived as follows. Drawing 
on the assumption that each unit of capital in the model is combined with one unit of la-
bor and the fact that w pβ = , where p is the construction cost of producer durables, I 
was able to write:   
                                                 
* *
* *
0 0
0 0
w K ( ) pK ( )
wK ( ) wL ( )
ββ = = . 
For the United States Evans (2000) estimated that in the postwar period the mean value 
of the undepreciated capital stock was 2.06 times the real gross domestic product, 
whereas the mean share of real gross domestic product paid to labor during the same pe-
riod was roughly 0.8. Hence the value of β  was in the vicinity of 2.5.  
• The interest rate σ was approximated by the return on capital. According to the esti-
mates by Evans (2000), the mean return on capital over the period 1947-1998 was 9%. 
• Finally, the rates of embodied technological change, and X Yμ μ , may be approximated 
by the growth rate of the average labor productivity in the economy as a whole. For the 
United States in the postwar period this rate has been in the neighborhood of 2%. By 
implication, the reciprocal of the capital coefficient 1/ /b( ) X ( ) L( )υ υ υ= declined at 
the same rate, so we can set that on the average 0.02X Xμ μ= = − . In short, in the 
simulations the variables and the parameters involved in equations (15), (20) και (27) 
take the following values:  
                                             
X
0 1   w=0.3  15,  =2.5
0
     {0.07  0.08  0.9  0.10}
    , { 1.5 2 2.5 3}.
Y
Y
Y
Y
P ( )
b ( )
η β
σ
μ μ
= = −
=
= − − − −
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The solution procedure involved two steps. In the first one, equation (20) was solved itera-
tively to obtain the values for . As in the case of equation (15), which was solved for 
and gave the results shown in the row 
*
YT
*
XT 2.5β =  of Table 2, this produced the 16 solutions 
that are exhibited in Tables 3. In the second step, the solutions for , together with 
the assumed values for the other variables and parameters, were introduced into (27) to calcu-
late . From the calculations emerged the 64 values that appear in Table 4.  So the task now 
is to reflect on these findings.  
* and XT
*
YT
z
(Please insert here Table 3) 
(Please insert here Table 4) 
   Searching for rows and columns where  is approximately equal to 1, observe that this 
occurs only in the two instances where {
z
0.08, 0.015}Xσ μ= = − and { 0.09, 0.02}Xσ μ= = − . 
Moreover, notice that in these instances the values of  remain nearly invariant with respect 
to 
z
Yμ , thus suggesting that the rate of embodied technological change in the Y sector does not 
matter.  From this it follows that, since in the United States in the postwar period the average rates 
of return on capital and the growth rate in the productivity of labor, as a proxy for technological 
progress, were close to these ranges, the conventional scheme of aggregation might not be inap-
propriate and we could forget about the differences in useful lives of producer durables in the 
various sectors of the economy. But according to the calculations by Evans (2000) and others, the 
rate of return on capital and the economy-wide growth rate in the productivity of labor varied sig-
nificantly from one five-year period to the next, let alone from one year to the next. In turn this 
implies that using the averages of the whole period instead of the annual observations may bias 
the aggregates of the capital stock and replacement investment.  
To get a feeling of the possible order of magnitude of these biases, consider the case 
of the capital stock. Its biases would depend on two factors, i.e. the value of the parameters 
involved in the calculation of useful lives and the relative quantities of capital in the two sec-
tors of the economy. For an example let: a) , either because *  XT T≠ *Y YXμ μ≠  or due to differ-
ences in the applied capital policies (i.e. replacement vs. scrapping); b) the quantity of capital in 
the Y sector is large relative to X sector, and c) the values of the parameters entering into the 
calculation of useful lives are close to { 0.07, 0.030, 0.015}X Yσ μ μ= = − = − . Then the conven-
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tional approach to aggregation will overestimate the aggregate capital stock a great deal be-
cause the value of  will be in the vicinity of its lower bound 0.836. On the contrary, if the 
values of the same parameters are {
z
0.10, 0.015, 0.015}X Yσ μ μ= = − = − , the conventional ap-
proach to aggregation will underestimate the aggregate capital stock because the value of  
will be at its upper bound of 1.066.  Moreover, observe from the latter case that, even though 
z
X Yμ μ= , the aggregation bias would still exist because , since the one representative 
firm applies replacement and the other scrapping. Therefore, from this evidence it follows that, 
if we do not allow for the age structure of capital, the conventional approach to aggregation may 
result in a correct measure of “capital-in general” only by numerical accident; and even then it 
will be conceptually faulty, because it does not allow properly for the effects of embodied techno-
logical change and the other determinants of useful lives.   
*  XT T≠ *Y
 
5. Summary of findings and conclusions  
With regard to the aggregation of producer durables, the dominant theory has been 
erected on two fundamental hypotheses and a result of theoretical deduction. Referring to the 
hypotheses, first and foremost among them is that the deterioration of producer durables is 
independent of their age. The second hypothesis is that the process by which producer dur-
ables deteriorate follows an exponential distribution, which implies that the amount of re-
placement investment is proportional to the outstanding capital stocks; and lastly the result of 
theoretical deduction is that in order to achieve consistent aggregation under the proportional-
ity hypothesis all producer durables must deteriorate at the same proportional rate. Certainly 
these conceptualizations make life easy because, by allowing us to approximate the decay of 
producer durables by a single-parameter function, we are able to bypass the analytical and 
computational complexities that would be involved if the decay of producer durables were 
conceived to vary with their age. But the proportionality hypothesis has been found to be in 
conflict with most of the available theoretical and empirical evidence and the need for alterna-
tive approaches to aggregation that would allow explicitly for the ability of firms to determine 
endogenously the useful lives of their durables in the presence of embodied technological 
change is long overdue. 
To this end in the present I constructed a two-sector vintage capital model in which 
the main thrust was to investigate the conditions for consistent aggregation in the presence of 
embodied technological change and endogenous useful lives. On the theoretical plain the re-
sults showed that because of the differences in the rates of embodied technological change 
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and/or in the capital policies applied, the conventional approach to aggregation is conceptu-
ally untenable. In view of this finding, I then adapted the aggregation mechanism first pro-
posed by Haavelmo (1960). In particular, to achieve consistent aggregation the stock of capi-
tal in the one sector was expressed in units of equal longevity with the stock of capital in the 
other sector. This procedure gave a measure of “capital-in-general” in the form of 
, where z is a complex function of the variables and parameters that enter 
into the determination of the useful lives of capital stocks in the two sectors of the economy. Finally, 
I simulated this function by assigning empirically plausible values to its determinants from the 
United States in the postwar period.  
* *[ 0 0X Yw K ( ) zK ( )β + ]
From these results there emerged two main conclusions. The first of them was that, if the 
variables and parameters in the model are approximated by their mean values over the postwar pe-
riod, then the conventional aggregation scheme gives approximately correct results, and hence we 
do not need to bother with the suggested adjustments for the longevity of the capital stocks in the 
economy. This corroborates the evidence presented by Hulten and Wykoff (1989). However, as 
these variables and parameters varied significantly from one year to the other, in all probability the 
useful lives varied significantly as well. Consequently, the second conclusion was that, depending 
on the distribution of capital stocks among the various sectors as well as their respective useful lives, 
the conventional approach to aggregation might be liable for significant biases in the economy-wide 
measurement of capital.  
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Endnotes
                                                 
1   On the side of econometric applications here is how Hulten et al. (1989) expressed the usefulness of the proportion-
ality hypothesis: “ We have found that a major event like energy crises, … did not in fact result in a systematic 
change in age-price profiles. This lends confidence to procedures that assume stationarity in order to achieve a ma-
jor degree of simplification (and because of nonstationarity is so difficult to deal with empirically). Or, put simply, 
the use of a single number to characterize the process of depreciation (of a given type of capital asset) seems justi-
fied in light of the results…” (p. 255).   
 
2   Three year later Griliches (1963) did take notice of the problems that were posed for aggregation from the durability 
of capital, but he failed to advance the art beyond the state Haavelmo (1960) had left it.  
 
3   At this point the choice of capital policy may appear to be imposed on the two firms exogenously. But it is not, be-
cause in an earlier stage the two firms solve the problem posed by Bitros and Flytzanis (2005), where the horizon of 
re-investment is determined endogenously. In other words, here it is assumed that, if the firms solved this problem 
in the light of the differences in the nature of and the demand for their products, firm X would apply replacement 
and firm Y scrapping.  
 
4   In addition, the proportionality hypothesis has several powerful advantages. According to Jorgenson (1974), one of 
them is that the theory of replacement that emerges is characterized by price-quantity duality. In particular: “… The 
level of acquisition of capital goods is dual to the rental price of capital services. Capital stock is dual to the acquisi-
tion price of capital goods. Replacement requirements, a component of investment expenditures are dual to depre-
ciation, a component of the rental price of capital services…” (p. 219). Another, demonstrated by Hall (1968, p. 
41), is that it renders the price of durables in the capital stock independent of the future values of the interest rate 
and the acquisition prices of new investment; and still another, pointed out by Harper (1982), is that under this hy-
pothesis the age-efficiency and the age-price profiles coincide and there is no need to distinguish between the capi-
tal stock as a factor of production and the capital stock as a store of value or wealth. Moreover, and perhaps most 
importantly for empirical research and policy applications, the proportionality hypothesis has the advantage that it 
simplifies significantly the computation of capital stock series through the perpetual inventory method.   
 
5   Just for the clarity of this term it should be noted that depreciation is dual to replacement investment, which consti-
tutes a component of gross investment equal to retirements plus the loss of efficiency in the surviving part of the 
stock of capital.  
 
6   Even though telephone companies, electric utilities, and other network industries construct a good deal of their capi-
tal internally, this conceptualization is quite removed from the actual economy. However, it is adopted in order to 
avoid the opening of a third sector, which would complicate the analysis significantly without adding much to the 
explanatory power of the model.  
 
7   The production of electricity is presumed to take place by combining one unit of capital with one unit of labor, 
whereas electricity-generating capacity is built within the firm solely by means of labor. Hence the addition of an 
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X
employment equation would turn the model into one of general equilibrium in labor and capital. However, as the 
ensuing analysis would not be affected, the employment of labor sector of the model is ignored.  
 
8   Regarding the impact of technological change, there are two possibilities. Technological change may affect 
the capital-output coefficient either positively or negatively. Normally new production techniques take the 
form of innovations that reduce the capital-output coefficient. But one cannot preclude isolated episodes of techno-
logical regression or of some heavily capital-intensive innovation, which for some period may increase the capital-
output coefficient above its downward trend. In this paper I focus only on the innovations that as a rule and on the 
average reduce the capital-output coefficient. 
 
9  To be sure, given that the demand for electricity is actually stochastic, in reality Firm X will need to keep ade-
quate slack capacity to avoid blackouts. Assuming that electric utilities have developed a rule by which they 
determine the percentage of stand-by capacity they must have to meet peak loads, the analysis is not affected 
because the optimal capacity may be defined to include this percentage of spare capacity.  
 
10  This policy is one of many that can possibly result when solving for the optimal re-investment horizon. Tight-
ening a bit further the assumption introduced in footnote 6, I assume for reasons of simplicity that, if firm X 
solved for the horizon of re-investments, the optimal capital policy would turn out to be one of infinite re-
placements at equal time distances.  
 
11  The detailed derivations of the first order conditions from the objective functions (8) and (13) are available on re-
quest from the author. 
 
12  Please note that the vertical axis in Figure 1 depicts the left-hand side of equations (15) and (20). Thus the axis 
measures the values taken by the functions g ( T ) Yh ( T )
* *
X Y
 and . The latter function, shown in Figure 1 by the 
corresponding bold upward sloping curve, will be explained below. 
 
13  The option to decide whether to exit or re-invest at the end of the initial investment cycle is not free. To ascertain 
the existence of the costs involved, assume first that firm Y decides to re-invest. In this event, given that T T< , 
firm Y renews its capital slower than firm X. But by doing so it foregoes the benefit of taking advantage of techno-
logical change at a quicker pace. Moreover, firm Y may have to absorb the costs that accompany the shutting down 
of business operations.  
 
14  Clearly, since in this case there is no infinite series of re-investments, the objective function of firm Y consists 
solely of a single acquisition of capital stock.  This explains why the denominator in equation (13) is missing 
from equation (18).  
 
15  In an economy with a small number of distinct kinds of capital goods it may be possible to sidestep the issues dis-
cussed immediately below by resorting to a fully disaggregated analysis. However, as the model under considera-
tion is intended to be generalizable to an economy with any number of heterogeneous capital goods, the adopted 
approach to aggregation is of particular methodological importance.  
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Appendix A 
 
Suppose that embodied technological progress reduces the capital-output coefficient 
 at the constant and exogenous rate Xb ( t ) μ . This rate scales with time because it depends on 
the interval over which it is considered. So suppose that we are at time t  and we observe a 
vintage of capital that was built υ  periods ago. On average, from υ  to t  the capital coeffi-
cient must have declined as follows: 
 
  X X
X
b (t) b (υ) ( t )
b (υ)
μ υ− = − ,                                              (A.1) 
                                              
with 0.μ <  
From this we get: 
 
       [1 ]X Xb (t) b (υ) ( t )μ υ= + − .                                              (A.2)                        
 
Now assume that the process of technological progress begins at t υ= . At that mo-
ment the capital coefficient will be equal to ( )b υ . Next divide the interval t υ−  into equal 
timesteps. At the end of the first timestep the capital coefficient will be: 
m
 
  [1 ].  X X
t tb ( ) b ( )
m m
υ υυ υ μ− −+ = +
                                      
(A.3)
 
 
At the end of the second timestep the capital coefficient will be: 
 
 22 [1 ] [1X X X
t t tb ( ) b ( ) b (υ)
m m m
] .t
m
υ υ υυ υ μ μ− − −+ = + + = + υ−                 (A.4)    
And at the end of the m timestep the capital coefficient will have declined to: 
   1 [1 mX X
t tb ( t ) b ( ( m ) )
m m
]υ υυ μ− −= + − + .                             (A.5)                        
Now let . Then, the timestep (∞→m ) /t mυ−  will go to zero and we will have: 
[1 ] ,  m ( tX X X
tb (t) b (υ) b (υ)e
m
μ υ )υμ −−= + =                            (A.6)                        
 
which is equation (8) in the text. 
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Appendix B 
 
Inserting (10) into (9) and rearranging we obtain: 
 
   1  0
1 1
X
X
T
X
X ( )T
X
eP ( ) b ( )w
e
μ
μ σ
η σ μ βσ
η σ
−
− −
− − += + − 0X .                              (B.1)                     
 
In turn, if this is introduced into (7) yields: 
 
  1 1  0
1
XT
X
X
en ( ) w
μ βσ
η σ
− += − + .                                       (B.2)                        
 
But the representative firm is presumed to defend its monopoly by restricting itself 
through pricing rule (5) to making only normal profits, i.e. profits that would result in an in-
dustry in perfectly competitive long-run equilibrium. So it will let the price elasticity of de-
mand Xη  approach to minus infinity and use the approximation: 
 
       1
1
X
X
η
η =+ .                                                         (B.3)                        
 
Now, if we deduct 1 from both sides of this equation and insert the result into (B.2) we obtain: 
 
      0Xn ( ) 0= .                                                         (B.4)                        
 
This proves that under the adopted pricing rule the unit net worth of equipment in the initial 
vintage is set equal to zero and corroborates the claim made in the text. 
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Appendix C 
 
  At υ  the worth of revenue minus the labor cost of operating a unit of equipment per 
small fraction dt of a year located at time t  is given by: 
 
                 [ ]( t ) ( t )P( ) e w e
b( )
μ υ σ υ dtυυ
− − −−                                             (C.1)                       
 
where w and σ  denote respectively the economy wide rates of wages and interest. 
Consequently at υ  the worth of the sum total of revenue minus operating labor cost of 
a unit of such equipment over its entire useful life T is: 
 
 
( )1 10 [ ]
T TT ( t ) ( t ) X
X
X
P( ) P ( ) e en e w e dt w w
b( ) b ( )
μ σ συ μ υ σ υ
υ
υ υβυ υ σ
− −+ − − − − −= − − = −−∫( ) μ σ .    (C.2)     
  
Now let p  be the purchase price of a new unit of electricity generators. Assuming its salvage 
value upon retirement is zero, its net worth is: 
 
   1 1
T TP(υ) e en(υ) w
b(υ)
μ σ σ
σ μ σ
− −− −= −−
( )
p− .                                   (C.3)                        
 
Finally, since by (4) the minimum labor required to build a new unit of electricity generating 
capacity is β , under perfectly competitive transfer prices from the capital building to the capital us-
ing department of the representative firm, plus the assumption that electricity generating capacity is 
built solely by means of labor, it will hold that: 
 
     p wβ= .                                                            (C.4)                        
 
Thus substituting (C.4) into (C.3) gives (12). 
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Appendix D 
Let a capital stock be replaced forever everyυ years. At time t=0 the firm acquires the 
vintage zero capital stock . At time 0 0 0X XK ( ) b ( )X ( )= Xt T= the vintage zero capital stock is 
retired and replaced by vintage υ  capital stock. But vintage  capital stock is more efficient due 
to technological progress. How more efficient it is relative to vintage zero capital stock is given by 
. Hence, to keep the capacity constant from vintage to vintage, at t
XT
0 XTX X Xb ( T ) b ( )e
μ= υ=  the 
capital stock that is needed for replacement is less. In particular, its quantity is given by 
.  At 0 0 0 XTX X X X XK ( T ) b ( T )X( )= b ( )X( )e
μ= 2 Xt T=  the capital stock that will be needed for 
replacement will be ; at time , the capital 
stock that will be needed is , and so on.  
22 2 0 0 0 XTX X X X XK ( T ) b ( T )X( )= b ( )X ( )e
μ= Xt jT=
0 0 0 Xj TX X X X XK (jT ) b (jT )X( )= b ( )X ( )e
μ=
Now, consider the net worth of the acquisitions. At time 0t =  the net worth of the 
capital stock is . At time 0 0 0 0 0X X X Xn ( )K ( ) b ( )n ( )X ( )= t υ=  the net worth of the acquired 
capital stock is  Notice in this expression 
that
0 0 0 XTX X X X X Xn (T )K (T )= b ( )n ( )X( )e .
μ
n( )υ has been substituted for . This has been done on account of the expressions (6) 
and (7) in the text. So, if the net worth of the capital stock acquired at 
0n( )
t υ=  is discounted to 
 using the discounting term we obtain . Finally, repeating 
the preceding steps for the net worth of capital stock acquired at , gives 
. Consequently, since in addition to the initial acquisition there take 
place 
0t = XTe σ− 0 0 0 X( )TX Xb ( )n ( )X ( )e μ σ−
Xt jT=
0 0 0 X( )jTX Xb ( )n ( )X ( )e
μ σ−
j  replacements, the net present value of the 1 j+ acquisitions of capital stock is given by: 
 
   .                             (D.1)                        0 0 0 [1 ... ]X( )T ( )jTX Xb ( )n ( )X ( ) +e e
μ σ μ σ− + + X−
 
The expression in the brackets is a geometric progression with1 j+  terms, each of 
which is equal to the preceding one multiplied by , where X( )jTe μ σ− 0X( )Tμ σ− < . This im-
plies that the bracketed expression constitutes a geometric progression with declining terms. Thus, if 
we set j → ∞ , at  the sum of the infinite series of replacements 
 is given by: 
0t =
0 ,  2X X X X XK ( ) K ( T ), K ( T ),...
    0 0 00
1 X
X X
X ( )T
b ( )n ( )X ( )A ( )
- e μ σ−
= .                                            (D.2)                        
 
This is equation (13) in the text. 
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Table 1: Notation of the variables and parameters of the model 
Variables Parameters 
              ,  X Y = Representative firms in the 
two sectors of the model. 
  ,  X ( ) Y( )υ υ = Quantities of consumer 
goods produced by firms 
X and Y in yearυ . 
X YK ( ), K ( )υ υ = Stocks of new physical 
capital built in yearυ  by 
firms X and Y. 
               K( )υ = Economy wide stock of 
physical capital in the 
economy in yearυ  
  X YP ( ), P ( )υ υ = Prices of consumer goods 
produced by firms X and Y. 
X Yp ( ), p ( )υ υ =  Unit prices of new capital 
goods constructed in 
year  by firms X and Y. υ
  X Yn ( ), n ( )υ υ = Unit present net worth of 
new producers’ durables 
built by firms X and Y in 
year υ . 
               = Useful lives of durables  X YT , T
       
,  X YN N
Y
= Multiplicative constants in the 
demand equations for the 
products produced by firms 
X and Y. 
,  XM M = Multiplicative constants in 
the equations that determine 
the minimum labor require-
ments in the construction of 
durables by firms X and Y  
 ,  X Yη η =   Price elasticities of demand 
for the outputs produced by 
firms X and Y. 
  = Physical capital coefficients 
pertaining to firms X and Y. 
,  X Yb b
    ,X Yμ μ = Rates of technological pro-
gress per annum pertaining to 
firms X and Y. 
          β =  Minimum labor required to 
build one unit of physical 
capital in the economy.  
          γ = Elasticity in the equation that 
determines the minimum la-
bor requirements in the con-
struction of physical capital. 
           = Money wage rate-numeraire w
          σ = Rate of interest per annum. 
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Table 2: Useful life of  from equation (15) * 0XK ( )
 
σ    
Xμ  0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
-0.015 18.8 19.4 19.9 20.5 
-0.020 13. 8 14.1 14.3 14.6 
-0.025 12.3 12.6 12.8 13.0 
2β=  
-0.030 11.2 11.4 11.6 11.8 
-0.015 21.4 22.1 22.8 23.5 
-0.020 15.5 15.9 16.2 16.6 
-0.025 13.9 14.2 14.4 14.7 
2.5β =  
-0.030 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.3 
-0.015 23.8 24.6 25.4 26.3 
-0.020 17.1 17.5 18.0 18.4 
-0.025 15.3 15.6 16.0 16.3 
3.0β =  
-0.030 13.9 14.2 14.4 14.7 
-0.015 26.0 27.0 27.9 29.0 
-0.020 18.6 19.1 19.6 20.1 
-0.025 16.6 17.0 17.4 17.8 
3.5β =  
-0.030 15.0 15.4 15.7 16.0 
 
 
 
     Table 3: Useful life of  from equation (20) * 0YK ( )
σ  2.5β =   
15Yη = −  0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 
-0.015 30.7 31.6 32.6 33.6 
-0.020 25.0 25.7 26.3 27.0 
-0.025 21.4 21.9 22.4 22.9 
 
Yμ  
-0.030 18.9 19.3 19.7 20.1 
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                                      Table 4:  Values of  from equation (27) z
 
0 1    0.3   15   =2.5 
0
Y
Y
Y
P ( ) w
b ( )
η β= = = −  
Yμ    
Xμ  -0.015 -0.020 -0.025 -0.030 
-0.015 0.968 0.976 0.982 0.987 
-0.020 0.919 0.934 0.947 0.958 
-0.025 0.875 0.894 0.912 0.928 
0.07σ =  
-0.030 0.836 0.858 0.879 0.899 
-0.015 1.008 1.008 1.008 1.007 
-0.020 0.964 0.971 0.977 0.982 
-0.025 0.922 0.933 0.944 0.954 
0.08σ =  
-0.030 0.884 0.899 0.913 0.926 
-0.015 1.040 1.036 1.031 1.026 
-0.020 1.001 1.002 1.003 1.004 
-0.025 0.962 0.968 0.973 0.978 
0.09σ =  
-0.030 0.926 0.935 0.944 0.952 
-0.015 1.066 1.058 1.050 1.042 
-0.020 1.031 1.029 1.026 1.023 
-0.025 0.995 0.998 0.999 1.000 
0.10σ =  
-0.030 0.961 0.966 0.971 0.976 
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